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A B S T R A C T
For advocates of the rights of persons with disabilities, particularly persons with mental disabilities, the human
right to live in the community as an equal member is seen to be central and, often, even as the basis for all other
human rights. Yet, despite its articulation in human rights law in the Convention on the Rights of People with
Disabilities (CRPD), foundational issues about the right remain undertheorized and unclear. This paper brings to
bear the capabilities approach, a normative framework about human well-being, social development and social
justice, to this central concern in disability rights, mental health ethics, and international human rights law:
protecting and respecting a person's right to live in a community as an equal. We argue that this human and
moral right is best conceptualized as a capability to live in the community as an equal member. The capabilities
approach provides this capability with a strong ethical framework and conceptual resources to guide reasoning
and its practical realization.
1. Introduction
The following discussion makes a philosophical argument for the
‘capability to live in the community as an equal member’ (CLCE) as a
moral foundation for the legal human right to live independently and be
included in the community (Article 19 of the CRPD). With the cap-
abilities approach (CA), a normative framework about human well-
being, social development and social justice as the philosophical
foundation, we articulate the CLCE. We bring to bear the CA to one of
the central concerns in disability rights, mental health, ethics, and in-
ternational human rights law— protecting and realizing a person's right
and ability to live in a community as an equal member.
For advocates of the rights of persons with disabilities, including
those persons with mental disabilities, the human right to live in the
community (HRLC) is seen to be central and even the foundation to
other rights and claims (Gradwohl, 2017; HRC, 2014). It is clearly ar-
ticulated in Article 19 of the CRPD as the right to live independently
and be included in the community (UNCRPD, 2006). The codification of
the HRLC in international law is a signal achievement and reflects an
important interest of persons with disabilities within legal debates. Yet,
despite the articulation in human rights law, foundational issues about
the right remain undertheorized and unclear. It is not made fully ex-
plicit what is so important about living in the community that it is seen
to be a human right and one which should be enshrined in international
law. Neither it is clear where this right comes from prior to it being
articulated in the law.
There is an urgent need to clarify the ethical framework and foun-
dations that can justify such a right as well as provide guidance on how
individuals, institutions, and societies should act in relation to it.
Without such a foundation or framework, there is a danger that the
HRLC will be vulnerable to the long-standing and new criticisms of
human rights (Hopgood, 2013; Moyn, 2018; Posner, 2014). Or that it
will be caught up in legal debates and litigations about its scope,
meaning and implications. As Tasioulas (2017) states about human
rights more generally, “we cannot sustain our commitment to human
rights on the cheap, by invoking only the law (…) Only a deeper jus-
tification can explain why we are right to embody them in the law…”
(online). In addition to pointing to the law (e.g. CRPD), a philosophical
and moral argument for the HRLC, including a coherent conception and
justification, is something we need in order to be able to explain it to
each other, wherever we are in the world. An argument to which no
reasonable person could object offers a deep justification of the rights
enshrined in human right law (Scanlon, 1998).
Grounding the HRLC in the CA is optimal as this approach is in-
clusive of all human beings (Nussbaum, 2006). In fact, the CA was
developed in response to the persistent deprivations experienced by
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disadvantaged people and the weaknesses of the standard approaches
to theorizing about social justice (Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 1979). The CA
also provides a substantive ethical foundation for human rights more
generally. As Vizard, Fukuda-Parr, and Elson (2011) state, it empha-
sizes “the importance of viewing human rights as having legitimacy and
validity within the ethical domain (rather than as simply being the
‘products’ of legal and institutional arrangements)” (p.2).
The claim for living in the community as an equal member is ar-
ticulated here as the CLCE and grounded in the two ethical values of
freedom and dignity, both foundational values of the CA. Whether
grounded in either value, it is a basic or central human capability (CHC)
and part of a minimally decent or flourishing human life. It is morally
valuable as a constituent part of wellbeing because of human beings'
inherent sociability, and instrumentally valuable as it helps pursue
other capabilities that make up a decent and flourishing life. Such a
right (and capability) is important for all humans and is relevant and
crucial for a diverse range of disadvantaged people.
However, it is particularly salient for persons with mental dis-
abilities because they have often been excluded, either physically
through institutionalization or socially through not being treated as
equal members. Among the many types of disability, mental impair-
ments have historically been among the most neglected conditions in
health and social policy (Black, Laxminarayan, Temmerman, & Walker,
2016). This has rendered those who suffer from them disabled, with
poor quality of life, vulnerable and often dependent on others (Lang,
Kett, Groce, & Trani, 2011). Moreover, the ‘moral status’ of persons
with mental disabilities who have cognitive impairments has long been
insecure in Western philosophical discussions (Putnam, Wasserman,
Blustein, & Asch, 2013; Wasserman, Asch, Blustein, & Putnam, 2012;
Wilkinson, 2008). The belief that people with mental impairments are
less than morally equal or not fully human makes them more vulnerable
to being excluded and deprived of living as equal members of human
communities.
The following discussion is organized into four sections. Section 2
introduces the capabilities approach while focusing on its relevance to
the present argument. Section 3 discusses the CRPD and Article 19.
Section 4 brings together the CA and Article 19 of the CRPD arguing
how the CA can provide the ethical basis for a human right to the
capability to live in the community as an equal member. It also presents
some possible misinterpretations and critiques of the CLCE argument.
Finally, in section 5, a conclusion to the discussion is presented.
In line with the social model of disabilities and the CA, which will
be further discussed in the paper, the term ‘disabilities’ will be used
throughout the text to refer to those conditions where persons with
impairments are disabled by the social, economic and environmental
conditions (external conditions in capabilities terminology) to which
they are exposed. The terms mental impairments and illnesses refer to
the individual biological or psychological conditions (internal condi-
tions in capabilities terminology) that affect a person's mental health at
any given time in their life (Burchardt, 2004; Oliver, 1983). In this
paper, following recommendations made in the CRPD, ‘persons with
disabilities’ will be the preferred term when speaking of individuals
with impairments who become disabled when interacting with several
social barriers (UNCRPD, 2006). This terminology is used in section 3 as
the CRPD focuses on disabilities more generally. However, in this
paper, the focus is on persons with mental disabilities. That is, those
individuals with mental impairments who become disabled from in-
teracting with external conditions. Although the proposed CLCE is re-
levant to all humans, we consider it is particularly salient to persons
with mental disabilities who have often had said capability denied
primarily through institutionalization and unequal treatment.
2. Capabilities approach
The CA is an analytical and ethical framework that redefines the
concepts of human well-being, equality and freedom as well as shifts
the paradigm of social development and progress. Some of the foun-
dational concepts of the CA can be traced back to Aristotle's under-
standing of human flourishing, Marx's conceptualization of function-
ings, and Adam Smith's idea of relative poverty (Sen, 1983, 1999c;
Wells, 2012). The initial presentation of the theory of human cap-
abilities was in the 1979 Tanner Lecture on Human Values entitled
“Equality of what?” given by the economist Amartya Sen, who was later
awarded a Nobel Prize for his contributions to welfare economics. In
the lecture, he identified the conceptual shortcomings of measuring
inequality, poverty and well-being in the then prevailing terms of in-
come or material resources, negative liberties, basic needs, or utility
(happiness). As an alternative, he put forward the concepts of human
“capabilities”, what individuals are able to be and do in their daily
lives, and capabilities equality/equity (Sen, 1979).
The CA motivates describing and evaluating a person's well-being or
quality of life in terms of her practically possible opportunities (‘cap-
abilities’) to achieve various outcomes – “beings and doings” –(‘func-
tionings’) that make up a good or flourishing life. From a CA perspec-
tive, social development or progress —in low, middle, and high-income
countries—is the expansion of such real opportunities of people. The CA
places individuals, their values, and their freedom of choice of pursuing
opportunities to be and do certain things at the center of analysis.
Importantly, the CA envisions well-being as something that is made up
of different kinds of beings and doings, which are each valuable and not
to be traded off (Nussbaum, 2002b, 2003, Nussbaum, 2006, Nussbaum,
2011; Sen, 1979, 1992, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c).
From the CA perspective, capabilities are not just internal char-
acteristics of a person and they are not individual capacities; cap-
abilities are formed through the combination of internal and external
conditions. The internal factors encompass individual, often biological
characteristics. These can include factors such as impairments, illness,
gender or age. All of which result in diverse biological needs. Whereas
external conditions encompass both the physical and social environ-
ments. These cover environmental diversities such as climatic circum-
stances; institutional variations such as the different public services
available in different contexts; varied relational perspectives which
relate to commodity requirements established by social norms, con-
ventions and customs; and distributional factors, such as how goods are
distributed among groups including families (Deneulin & Shahani,
2009; Sen, 1999c). As a result, the CA “provides a way of con-
ceptualizing the disadvantage experienced by individuals in society,
which emphasizes the social, economic and environmental barriers to
equality” (Burchardt, 2004, p.735).
Martha Nussbaum, who collaborated with Sen for some years has
also made significant contributions to the CA. She has developed a
theory of ten CHCs and grounds them in human dignity. This contrasts
to Sen's grounding of the CA in the value of freedom. Nussbaum un-
derstands human beings as ethical subjects who, in line with
Aristotelian and Marxian thought, are beings that are needy, sociable
and have the ability to reason (Formosa & Mackenzie, 2014; Nussbaum,
2002b). These characteristics are the basis of her conception of dignity
and are what “gives rise to moral claims on others for the protection
and development of some basic capabilities” (Venkatapuram, 2014
p.410). She argues that dignity's relation to other notions which include
respect, agency and equality is what makes it important to human lives
(Nussbaum, 2011). Her theory of basic justice, or pre-political (read
pre-legal) entitlements, consists of central capabilities that all people
should possess, and up to a certain threshold (Nussbaum, 2011).
Nussbaum's ten central capabilities make up a life with human
dignity. Her list includes capabilities for 1) life, 2) bodily health, 3)
bodily integrity, 4) senses, imagination and thought, 5) emotions, 6)
practical reason, 7) affiliation, 8) other species, 9) play, and 10) control
over one's environment (Nussbaum, 1997, 2011). The list of central
capabilities can be added to and adapted to fit different contexts.
However, societies cannot neglect any of the basic ten, and the whole
population must have or be brought up to a specified threshold of each
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of these central capabilities. Given the plurality of values and variation
in social priorities that exist in different countries, the various thresh-
olds can and should be established by each nation (Nussbaum, 2011).
Nussbaum has, however, not explicitly stated how each threshold is to
be determined beyond stating that it should be achieved through ex-
pertise and democratic debate. Given the ten capabilities constitute
only a minimal human flourishing, Nussbaum's is a partial or basic
theory of justice. It is not a full theory or conception of social justice, as
it is “a social-minimum approach… it doesn't say what should be done
about inequalities above its rather ample threshold” (Nussbaum, 2009,
p.332).
Over the four decades since the lecture and following from the many
publications by Sen on the subject, an extensive interdisciplinary school
of thought has developed around the initial idea of human capabilities.
Scholars, researchers, and practitioners have developed and used the
approach as an analytical and normative framework in a broad range of
fields. The analytical contribution of the CA is the measuring of well-
being in terms of capabilities, which is argued to be more coherent than
measuring resource holdings, liberties, basic needs, or utility. Examples
of this application include the analysis and measurement of national
wellbeing, poverty and inequality, the modelling and evaluation of
development projects, and the assessment of living standards (Alkire,
2002, 2005; Anderson, 1999; Arneson, 2002; Brighouse, & Robeyns, I.
(Eds.)., 2010; Deneulin, 2003; Wolff, & de-Shalit, A., 2007). And its
normative or ethical contribution is the philosophical justification for
every individual's moral claims to capabilities, as well as for a con-
ception of a good society as one that protects and expands human
capabilities (Robeyns, 2005, 2011, 2017). This has resulted, for ex-
ample, in the prescription and design of welfare policies.
2.1. Disabilities in the CA
In most articulations of the capabilities approach, health capability
(ies) is considered one of the basic dimensions of a good life
(Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 1999c). Multiple scholars have used the CA to
explore and analyze matters of health and its centrality to wellbeing
(Burchardt, 2004; Coast, Smith, & Lorgelly, 2008; Entwistle, Cribb, &
Owens, 2018; Ruger & Mitra, 2015; Venkatapuram, 2011). Among
health topics, philosophical arguments from the CA have also been put
forward considering disabilities in relation to distributive justice. Ac-
knowledging the individual diversity of human beings and how they are
each uniquely situated in daily life are central tenets of the CA. As a
result, persons with disability are considered equal from the start of
theorizing about equality and social justice. Both Sen and Nussbaum
have included disability in many of their writings, including in the in-
itial Tanner lecture (Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 1979, 1999b, 2009).
Since the CA focuses on what people are capable of being and doing,
and that one of the main tenets of the CA is that diversity is intrinsic to
human beings, understanding how individuals convert resources (ex-
ternal conditions and commodities) into capabilities and functionings
that are valuable to wellbeing is central (Robeyns, 2011). Within the CA
the concept of ‘conversion factors’ reflects the varying abilities people
have to turn their internal characteristics and external conditions into
beings and doings they value. This is true for all individuals and is
particularly salient for persons with disabilities. For example, a person
with a severe mental impairment might require more resources to cover
costs of full-time care which enables her to enjoy the same level of well-
being as someone without a mental disability who does not require
care. Therefore, the CA enables viewing disability or capabilities con-
straints as being produced through a combination of both internal and
external factors that impede the person to function in society fully,
rather than solely as the product of biology or individual duties
(Burchardt, 2004; Harnacke, 2013; Mitra, 2006, 2018).
Every human being will be constrained by their biology at various
times throughout their lives. As such, the CA understands that dis-
abilities might be temporary or permanent, and also claims that people
should be entitled to basic capabilities regardless (Nussbaum, 2002a)
How disabled, in-capable, or unfree people are to pursue a decent life is
determined by the combination of their internal and external conditions
and the temporality of these (Burchardt, 2004; Mitra, 2018; Nussbaum,
2002a; Ruger & Mitra, 2015). In light of this view, the CA has proven to
be an important and productive framework to identify and measure
how persons with disabilities, including mental disabilities, require
different types and amounts of resources, based on their conversion
factors, to achieve the same (read equal) capabilities and functionings
as non-disabled persons (Burchardt, 2004; Sen, 1994). This under-
standing has also helped expose legal rights violations in the barriers
people with disabilities face in everyday activities and in accessing
support (Szmukler & Bach, 2015).
This evidences that the CA shares several commonalities with the
social model of disability (Burchardt, 2004; Dubois & Trani, 2009;
Mitra, 2006). Namely, disabilities are limitations on opportunities to be
part of the community in equal standing to others. The social model
maintains that disabilities are produced from physical, social and eco-
nomic environmental factors to which people are subjected (Burchardt,
2004; Oliver, 1983). The distinction between disability, which involves
the social, economic and environmental or external conditions, and
impairment, which refers to the biological or internal condition, is the
seminal contribution of the social model of disability (Oliver, 1983). It
places the blame of non-participation in the community on the social
conditions rather than on the individual who has an impairment
(Burchardt, 2004). In comparison, the CA starts from the position that
people in a society will each have different needs and abilities
(Harnacke, 2013), these change over the life course, and some will have
severe impairments throughout their life. Ignoring such diversity both
in theorizing and practical policymaking is seen to be the reason for
much preventable suffering as well as toleration of inequalities in
wellbeing.
Sen, Nussbaum, and other CA advocates have clearly asserted that
persons with disabilities should be considered on an equal standing
within a given society (Nussbaum, 2006; Sen, 1999b, 2009). Disability
rights advocates find the CA compelling because people with dis-
abilities are not an afterthought to the CA's conceptualization of well-
being equity and justice and are central to the way the framework was
developed and functions. Also, the social disability model says that
social conditions are what makes people disabled, but it does not give
an ethical argument for why social conditions should enable people.
The CA makes an argument for capabilities (abilities), and then says it is
unjust for social conditions to neglect or constrain the capabilities of
people. The CA extends positive obligations for respecting human rights
to support and defend these, in addition to negative duties to leave
individuals to pursue their diverse conceptions of life (Sen, 2009;
Vizard, 2010). The CA is both analytically helpful and normatively
powerful. As a matter of justice, society must refrain from harming/
interfering individuals and has positive obligations to help expand
capabilities.
3. CRPD & Article 19
Human rights law is an important framework that has been har-
nessed to address the interests of persons with disabilities. Although the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) aimed for in-
clusivity and providing rights for all people, at that time persons with
disabilities “were still considered as ‘objects’ of charity, medical treat-
ment and social welfare” (UN., 2018). Most recently, the CRPD con-
stitutes a paradigm shift in comparison to other human rights treaties. It
acknowledges persons with disabilities, both mental and physical, as
‘subjects’ with rights, “who are capable of claiming those rights and
making decisions for their lives based on their free and informed con-
sent as well as being active members of society” (Quinn & Doyle, 2012;
UNCRPD, 2006).
Indeed, there is a long history of persons with disabilities being
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incorporated into numerous international rights agreements prior to the
CRPD. However, the perception of persons with disabilities as objects of
social concern, rather than as individuals with agency has persisted.
And this perception has led to severe deprivations and violations of the
moral rights of persons with disabilities. Additionally, it was still un-
clear what specific or unique claims persons with disabilities have, and
what the obligations the national governments and others have to en-
sure these claims or rights are realized (UN., 2007). Disability rights
advocates and the international community sought to address the lack
of inclusion, dehumanization and persistent discrimination of persons
with disabilities through drafting a new human rights instrument (UN.,
2007).
As such, the CRPD is “the latest addition to the body of core inter-
national human rights instruments” (UN., 2007, p.5). It comprehen-
sively identifies that persons with disabilities are rights holders and full
citizens who make valuable contributions to society. The purpose is “to
promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to
promote respect for their inherent dignity” (UNCRPD, 2006, online).
Although the CRPD does not define disability, it states that persons with
disabilities include persons with physical, mental, intellectual or sen-
sory disabilities (UNCRPD, 2006).
The CRPD aims to establish that persons with disabilities are en-
titled to human rights by nature of being human and offers an un-
precedented level of protection to these persons. The Convention does
not put forth any new human rights and rather aims at clarifying the
duties States have to respect and ensure the equal enjoyment of existing
human rights by persons with disabilities. As such, it identifies where
modifications need to be made and where protection (read support)
needs to be put in place for persons with disabilities to be able to access
the human rights that they have had continuously violated (UN., 2007).
The Convention, as a binding international treaty and legal human
rights instrument with a social development dimension, seeks to lift
barriers that hinder persons with mental disabilities’ ability to fully
participate ‘as equal members’ in societies worldwide (Szmukler, Daw,
& Callard, 2014; UNCRPD, 2006).
In attempting to lift these barriers, beyond arguing for persons with
disabilities as subjects, the CRPD also differs from previous human
rights articulations in several ways. First, it establishes clear responsi-
bilities and actions for states in order to respect, protect and ensure
these rights. This is to be done through incorporating these rights into
the national legal system, as well as through raising awareness, in-
creasing service accessibility, providing protection in humanitarian
crises, ensuring accessibility to justice, enabling mobility and re-
habilitation, and monitorization of policies and statistics (HRC, 2014;
UN., 2007, 2018; UNCRPD, 2006). Second, it establishes the State has
the responsibility to be inclusive of persons with disabilities in all de-
velopment interventions, both on a national and international level.
Third, the CRPD requires that States consult with organizations that
represent persons with disabilities on matters that affect them, be it
through policies aimed specifically with them in mind, or those that
might affect them. And fourth, the CRPD also identifies the importance
of international cooperation through shared knowledge, capacity
building, and economic assistance (HRC, 2014; UN., 2007, 2018;
UNCRPD, 2006).
Importantly, consulting persons with disabilities reflects the right of
persons with disabilities to control how they want to live as well as
participate in the community (CRPD Committee, 2017). In line with
this claim, the CRPD argues that “independent living and an inclusive
life in the community are ideas that are inextricably linked with the
disability rights movement” (CRPD Committee, 2017, p.1). Therefore,
the CRPD is also innovative by explicitly including Article 19, the right
to live independently and in the community. In fact, this right has been
described as being the essence of the entire convention (Gradwohl,
2017; HRC, 2014; Quinn & Doyle, 2012; Simplican, Leader, Kosciulek,
& Leahy, 2015) and “a substantive means for the realization of other
rights” (HRC, 2014). Furthermore, the converse is also asserted; the
Convention's core principles enunciated in Article 3, “(…) particularly
respect for the individual's inherent dignity, autonomy and in-
dependence (Art. [a]), and the full and effective participation and in-
clusion in society (Art. 3[c])” are the foundation of Article 19 (CRPD
Committee, 2017).
Social exclusion, and often being physically isolated from family
and community, did not seem to be a prominent concern for non-dis-
abled individuals. Therefore, a right to protect against this was not
explicitly expressed in human rights law. Living in the community looks
to have been a starting assumption in previous human rights declara-
tions and treaties. The CRPD transforms that assumption into an explicit
and central right by emphasizing that “living as a part of our commu-
nities – from local to global – serves as the basis for everything we do in
life” (CECHR, 2012). Furthermore, it is based on the idea that human
flourishing is more likely when we are able to develop in a community
with others (Quinn & Doyle, 2012). Article 19 thus “embodies a positive
philosophy, which is about enabling people to live their lives to their
fullest, within society” (CECHR, 2012).
This right is a result of the CRPD's aim to ensure rights already
available to persons without disabilities to persons with disabilities no
matter how severe the disability is or how intensive the support needs
are (Hammarberg, 2012). This right to live independently and be in-
cluded in the community is articulated in Article 19 of the CRPD as
follows:
“States Parties to the present Convention recognize the equal right
of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices
equal to others, and shall take effective and appropriate measures to
facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and
their full inclusion and participation in the community, including en-
suring that: (a) Persons with disabilities have the opportunity to choose
their place of residence and where and with whom they live on an equal
basis with others and are not obliged to live in a particular living ar-
rangement; (b) Persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-
home, residential and other community support services, including
personal assistance necessary to support living and inclusion in the
community, and to prevent isolation or segregation from the commu-
nity; (c) Community services and facilities for the general population
are available on an equal basis to persons with disabilities and are re-
sponsive to their needs” (UNCRPD, 2006, online).
The different clauses of Article 19 identified aim at protecting dif-
ferent aspects of this right. Clause (a) is focused on choice and the
conception of persons with disabilities as autonomous individuals with
the capacity of making their own choices (CECHR, 2012). It also em-
phasizes the importance of not being restricted to a specific living ar-
rangement. Such a freedom is aimed at avoiding forced or unnecessary
institutionalization (Quinn & Doyle, 2012). Clause (b) expresses the
importance of individualized community support. It reflects a concep-
tion of independent living, where independence is not meant living in a
self-sufficient manner at a distance from others. Instead, it argues for
support systems, which the individual can choose and be in control of,
to be put in place (CECHR, 2012). Finally, clause (c) focuses on equality
for persons with disabilities when it comes to public services that exist
in the community. It calls for increased social connectedness and for
existing social services to be inclusive of persons with disabilities; dis-
abled and non-disabled citizens should be able to access public services
as equal members of society and citizens (Quinn & Doyle, 2012).
These clauses highlight the areas in which the State needs to take
action to protect the right to live independently and be included in the
community. Nevertheless, no easy solutions follow on how to imple-
ment this right. It has been argued that the CRPD is an ambitious treaty
and that despite the ratification of the CRPD by states, it is difficult to
hold these accountable of implementation (De Búrca, 2010; Molas,
2016). It is often the case that adhering to the CRPD will require States
to overhaul their infrastructure and legislation, making implementation
costly and complicated, particularly in some contexts. This seems
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especially so concerning the rights of persons with mental disabilities
(McSherry, 2014).
Further, in some situations, there is a lack of understanding of dis-
abilities from a human rights perspective despite the political discourse
stating the contrary (Lang et al., 2011). Among the main challenges
identified in implementing the CRPD, Lang et al. (2011) argue that
rights claims continue to be seen as within the realm of charity due to
countries having “(…) limited knowledge, understanding, and in some
case [limited] support for the fundamental principles and practices
underpinning human rights” (p.215). Consequently, human rights vio-
lations of persons with physical and mental impairments continue to
persist and are reported around the world (Szmukler & Bach, 2015).
Given these issues, a conceptual and ethical framework for Article
19 of the CRPD, including a strong justification beyond or prior to in-
ternational human rights law, is necessary to ensure that persons with
mental impairments can turn this foundational right into something
meaningful in their daily lives. The CLCE grounded in the capabilities
approach has the potential to help individuals and communities un-
derstand and realize this right, as well as institutions and governments
recognize its place in policymaking. The justification for this right and
where it comes from prior to legal discourse is useful for governments
to understand why it is important. Thus, the CA can give meaning to the
legal human rights articulated in international treaties. Similarly, the
concept of a threshold in the capabilities approach can allow govern-
ments to work toward enabling a minimal level of the CLCE that is in
line with a dignified life given their resource constraints and contextual
priorities.
The argument can also assist disability advocates to access the
ethical language and resources of theories of justice, including debates
about rights, human rights, equality, and wellbeing. The conceptual
clarity on what is meant by disability offered by the CA, as well as the
social model of disability, enables advocates to explain to governments
the contents of human rights documents. This ethical language can also
help to explain the values that ground the CLCE. Freedom and dignity
are values that can be more widely supported in different contexts than
international legal documents that result from political deliberation.
4. Ethical foundations of the human right to live in the community
(HRLC)
The CA can be a useful framework from which to address issues
raised by the CRPD. In fact, there is some evidence that the CRPD was
informed by the CA, just as it has also influenced many other recent
international treaties. The notion of human flourishing, central to the
CA, has also been claimed to be “deeply embedded in the logic of the
UN CRPD” (Quinn & Doyle, 2012). But much of the conceptual clarity
of the CA may have been lost in the final texts of the convention which
are often achieved through difficult political and legal negotiations
typical of international proceedings (Basser, Jones, & Rioux, 2011;
Venkatapuram, 2014). The following section aims to present the CA's
conceptualization of the right to live independently and in the com-
munity as an equal member, and its centrality to human well-being.
Both Sen and Nussbaum have, in some way, discussed the centrality
of the capability to live in the community to the CA, even though not
explicitly articulating it as a basic capability. Furthermore, Sen's focus
on freedoms and Nussbaum's focus on dignity both provide good
starting points for the ethical underpinnings of Article 19. All reason-
able human beings value freedoms to design, pursue and revise their
life plans (Sen, 1992; Venkatapuram, 2013). The CA articulates clearly
the importance of having real opportunities to be and do what one
values, incorporating both the importance of autonomy and the un-
derstanding that providing social conditions that create capabilities,
specific to the diversity of the individual, enables autonomy and is the
obligation of the surrounding society, including the State apparatus.
While Sen has not identified a universal and core set of human
capabilities, his discussion on the freedom to live in the community as
an equal is evidence of its importance (Sen, 2002). He considers in-
dividuals to be inherently social and stresses that individual freedoms
depend on social arrangements (Deneulin & Ritchie, 2006; Sen, 2002).
It is clear from Sen's writings on capabilities and wellbeing that he
considers social integration as a capability that is widely valued
(Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). That is, sociability is an important freedom,
and social interactions create certain freedoms. Furthermore, Sen ar-
gues that social exclusion can lead to other forms of deprivation. For
example, being excluded from social relations can lead one to not have
the opportunity to be employed and this may lead to impoverishment
that further constrains one's opportunities (Sen, 2000).
Sen has also made several arguments about shame and being able to
participate in society. Sen speaks about the existence of certain moral
rights, that might not be articulated in law, which a person requires to
feel included in the community. He illustrates this with the example of
the importance of protecting a person's freedom of speech by ensuring
that persons with stammers are not ridiculed (Sen, 2009). He also
makes the point that often, being a member of a community requires
having similar capabilities as all the others in the community in order to
avoid shame and enable social interactions (Sen, 1983). All of these
above ways that community is important to human wellbeing, Sen ar-
gues, are related to “the Aristotelian understanding that the individual
lives an inescapably ‘social’ life” (Sen, 2000, p.4).
However, despite highlighting the importance of being included in
the community as an equal member, Sen claims that the capabilities
that are identified as valuable should be arrived at through public de-
liberation. Further, he makes a practical argument about the link be-
tween capabilities and human rights. He argues that capabilities are
basic freedoms that come to be considered human rights when they
achieve a threshold of relevance,−which includes both the importance
of this freedom and the possibility of realizing it. Such a relevance must
also be arrived at through public reasoning, where the society's value of
a particular kind of freedom will justify its incorporation into human
rights (Sen, 2009).
On the other hand, Nussbaum asserts her CHCs to be pre-political
entitlements of human rights. She understands these basic capabilities
as universal moral claims that can provide the grounding of legal claims
enshrined in state constitutions and international human rights treaties.
She argues, however, that a right when it is ‘put down on paper’ is not
enough. Only when effective measures are in place for people to
achieve them do these become real (Nussbaum, 2002b).
Regarding being included in the community, Nussbaum has argued
that “human beings enjoy status dignity by virtue of their humanity;
that is, by virtue of their membership of, first, the human species and,
second, the human community” (Formosa & Mackenzie, 2014). And, in
her list, she has explicitly included the capability for affiliation
(Nussbaum, 1997, 2011). Moreover, she expresses the view that al-
though all capabilities on her list are of central importance, affiliation,
as well as practical reason, are “of special importance because they both
organize and suffuse all the other capabilities, making their pursuit
truly human” (Nussbaum, 1995, 1997). The capability of affiliation,
according to Nussbaum, aims to give people the freedom of:
“(A) being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of
social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.
(Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute
and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of
assembly and political speech.) (B) Having the social bases of self-re-
spect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being
whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity,
caste, religion, national origin” (Nussbaum, 2011, p.34).
Although there is some disagreement among CA scholars about es-
tablishing a list of CHC, it is clear from the above, that the CLCE is
identified in both Sen and Nussbaum's approaches. Building on this
work, the CLCE can be conceptualized as follows. Grounded in freedom
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or dignity, the capability to live in the community as an equal member
is an important aspect of a flourishing life. Such a capability is as im-
portant, if not crucial, to the wellbeing of individuals with disabilities as
it is for non-disabled individuals. And, the capability remains important
whether the disability is permanent or temporary.
It consists in the freedom to decide on one's living arrangements
within the community, as well as the freedom to participate as an equal
member in society in line with a life worth dignity. That is, the CLCE
entails the freedom to be included in the community as an equal with
adequate support from the state and other members of the community.
Support must be provided considering both internal and external fac-
tors that allow for a person to achieve the CLCE. As such, it represents
both social and physical inclusion within the community and requires
support from the social and physical environment, as well as resources.
It produces duties for social support, involving an adequate level of care
and the availability of caretakers to support persons with disabilities
and enable this freedom. Similarly, it requires support from the physical
environment through institutions and infrastructure being inclusive and
responsive to the needs of persons with disabilities, including persons
with mental disabilities. Additionally, given the diverse abilities hu-
mans have to convert resources into beings and doings, there is a duty
to provide adequate resource distribution that enables persons with
mental disabilities to achieve the same level of social and physical in-
clusion within the community as that of persons who do not have a
disability.
What is important is that the CLCE is a component of wellbeing,
which is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. It is in-
trinsically valuable because humans are inherently social and needy
beings (Nussbaum, 2002b; Sen, 2002). The freedom to be socially and
physically included in the community is part of what makes up a life of
equal human dignity. On the other hand, the CLCE is instrumentally
valuable because this capability enables other basic human capabilities
to be realized. Living in the community as an equal member allows
persons with disabilities to participate in social arrangements and in-
teractions on which other valuable freedoms depend.
One source of misinterpretation has been through the translations of
the HRLC into other languages. Mladenov (2013), found that in-
dependent living had been translated as ‘self-standing’ and ‘autono-
mous’ in several languages. This might result in policies that advocate
for ‘deinstitutionalization’ without providing support in the community
to exercise everyday activities while living independently. Indeed, in-
dependent living can be interpreted in a variety of ways in English as
well. A clear capability to live in the community as an equal member
produces duties to support a person with disabilities to have the
freedom to live a life worth dignity.
The CLCE argument is not meant to achieve deinstitutionalization
with the result of persons being left to fend for themselves. Such a view
“rest on a mistaken notion that living in the community is solely about
physical placement in the community” (CECHR, 2012). Moreover, these
mistaken interpretations do not take into account that “countless more
people with disabilities are physically located in their communities, but
barred from meaningful participation (…) because either services are
not available or communities are organized in ways that exclude them
from participation” (CECHR, 2012).
Thus, true participation includes relying on social solidarity, as
being included in the community goes hand in hand with belonging to
families and other groups that can provide support (Deneulin & Ritchie,
2006; Stewart, 2005; Trani & Dubois, 2011). The CLCE reflects a full
inclusion of a person with a disability in their environment as it makes
the argument for persons to live as equal members, in other words, in
equal standing with others. That is, they must not be expected to be
fully autonomous and must not be isolated from participating in the
community as this would not be expected of a person who does not
have a disability. This capability embodies the understanding that for
persons with disabilities to live a decent or minimally flourishing life
they must have equal freedoms as others.
Some of the criticisms the argument for the capability to live in
community as an equal member could receive include the point that
scarcity of resources makes it incoherent to assert something as a moral
right to a basic capability when it cannot immediately be realized. Or
that the capabilities framework is an imposition of Western values and
reasoning.
The resource scarcity critique is also made of human rights ap-
proaches. That is, something cannot be a right or a human right if it
cannot be immediately be realized, Framing this right as a capability
allows for making the claim that persons are morally entitled to live in
the community as equal members, and for arguing for the corre-
sponding duty nation-states have to take responsibility in ensuring that
it is realized. Furthermore, Nussbaum's conceptualization of a threshold
affects the resource critique in realizing the capability to live in the
community as an equal member. Nussbaum's approach allows for na-
tions to establish the threshold of each capability, reflecting minimal
human dignity, ensuring that all persons have access to this capability.
Where a country does not have the resources to help their citizens to
reach the threshold, international assistance is required. This will entail
nation-states with more resources to support those who cannot provide
basic threshold capabilities for their citizens as a matter of global justice
(Nussbaum, 2009).
While some scholars state that the CA, like human rights, reflects
Western values (Dean, 2009; Stewart, 2001), Nussbaum has claimed
that the CA is able to avoid this critique. Nussbaum's approach is based
on an account of human flourishing which is historically grounded and
based on an empirical inquiry of what persons in different societies
value, and, primarily, the result of philosophical theorizing (Nussbaum,
1992, 2011). Her list of 10 CHC is one that has evolved over years of
cross-cultural discussions, which she argues can lead to overlapping
consensus on the items included (Nussbaum, 2000). Furthermore, she
argues that given it is a social-minimum approach, her list enables
multiple ways of life, which can be supported in all societies, including
pluralistic societies. The capabilities on her list may be constructed and
realized differently in different societies rather than imposing a parti-
cular conception of the good life in all contexts (Nussbaum, 1992, 2000;
Nussbaum, 2006; Uyan-Semerci, 2007; Vasbist, 2010). Indeed, as Uyan-
Semerci (2007) has noted, “the approach derives its strength because it
genuinely attempts to develop an understanding of human diversity”
(p.203). Moreover, Sen claims that freedom, the basis of the CA, has
been found to be a value that is universally shared across different
cultures and societies (Sen, 1999c). Similarly, Robeyns (2017) has
stated that since the CA terminology is not tied to a western or colonial
power it is not considered an instrument of domination as has been
claimed with human rights.
5. Conclusion
Disability rights advocates have pressed for the human right to live
independently and in the community for persons with disabilities, as
they claim this right is foundational to other rights. Indeed, this right
(and capability) is important for all humans and particularly pressing
for vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities. Despite a
longstanding history of persons with disabilities being the focus of
various international rights agreements, the CRPD represents a para-
digm shift and achievement for disability rights movements. However,
scholars and practitioners have identified “a need for further ethical
argumentation in justifying why and how such a paradigm shift exists”
(Celik, 2017, p.935). Questions such as what is important about living
in the community and where this right comes from prior to the law
remained unclear.
In answering that call, we have sought to ground the right to live
independently in the community in the capability approach as it can
serve as the ethical framework and foundations that can justify such a
right. This right was conceptualized as a capability and it was shown it
is grounded in the two values of freedom and dignity. The capability to
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live in the community as an equal member consists in being able to
decide on one's living arrangements within the community, as well as
having the freedom to participate as an equal member in society in line
with a life worth dignity.
As such, the CLCE entails the freedom to be included in the com-
munity as an equal with adequate support from the state and other
members of the community to do so. In specific, it was made clear that
this capability is not simply an argument for deinstitutionalization of
persons with mental impairments without proper support. Rather it is a
positive argument for supporting persons with mental disabilities to
develop the CLCE which will enable real inclusion within the commu-
nity.
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